LA6HLan1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 18 Cr. 601 (PGG) V. 5 JEAN-CLAUDE OKONGO LANDJI, and JIBRIL ADAMU, 6 Trial 7 Defendants. 8 New York, N.Y. 9 October 6, 2021 9:45 a.m. 10 11 Before: 12 HON. PAUL G. GARDEPHE, 13 District Judge 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 AUDREY STRAUSS United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York 16 MATTHEW HELLMAN 17 ELINOR TARLOW Assistant United States Attorneys 18 SHER TREMONTE 19 Attorneys for Defendant Landji BY: MICHAEL TREMONTE 20 NOAM BIALE KATIE ELIZABETH RENZLER 21 THOMAS F.X. DUNN JACQUELINE CISTARO 22 Attorneys for Defendant Adamu 23 Also Present: 24 Emmanuel Orji, Interpreter (French) 25 Marie Jose Voigt, Interpreter (French)

(Case called)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: United States of America v. Jibril Adamu and Jean-Claude Landji, counsel for the government, please state your name.

MS. TARLOW: Good morning, your Honor. Elinor Tarlow, for the government. I am joined at counsel table by my colleague Matthew Hellman.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel for the defendants, please state your names.

MR. DUNN: Good morning, your Honor. Thomas Dunn and Jacqueline Cistaro for Jibril Adamu.

MR. BIALE: Good morning, your Honor. Noam Biale and Katie Renzler for Jean-Claude Landji.

THE COURT: Please be seated.

Jury selection is going to begin in this matter later this morning. I want to address a few outstanding issues before we head to the jury assembly room for the jury selection process.

First, I want to correct something I said to you earlier about peremptory challenges. I think I told you at the last conference that we would be selecting three alternates, and I think I also told you that with respect to the three alternates, the parties would have three peremptory challenges. If I said that, that was incorrect. We will be selecting three alternate jurors.

MR. BIALE: I'm sorry, your Honor. I'm sorry to interrupt. The interpretation is apparently not working, so Mr. Landji can't hear anything.

(Discussion off the record)

MR. BIALE: Thank you. I apologize, your Honor.

THE COURT: Not a problem.

I was saying that we will be selecting three alternate jurors, as I told the parties at our last conference. I think I may have told the parties that they would have three peremptory challenges with respect to the selection of the three alternate jurors. If I said that, that was incorrect. Each side will have two peremptory challenges for purposes of selecting the three alternate jurors. Citing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c)(4)(B).

I also want to review with the parties how I do jury selection, which is through the use of the simultaneous submission of lists of jurors against whom the parties wish to exercise peremptory challenges. So the way this is going to proceed is I will qualify the 42 people sitting in the jury assembly room. That is capacity for the jury assembly room given the pandemic. After I've done that, I will hear the lawyers up at the bench with respect to any challenges for cause, and I will rule on those applications. I will then ask the lawyers to prepare a list of the panel members against whom they wish to exercise peremptory challenges, and then those

lists will be submitted simultaneously.

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In normal times it is my practice to take a recess and send the jury panel out of the courtroom while the lawyers are preparing their lists. I've been told by the jury office people who control this process that it is not practical for me in current circumstances to send the jury panel out of the jury assembly room. So what that means is that I am going to need the lists from you of the jurors against which you wish to exercise peremptory challenges rather quickly. So what that's going to require you to do is as we're qualifying the jurors, you're going to need to make notes about which panel members you think you might want to exercise peremptory challenges against, because I can't give you a half an hour to figure out who they are after we've spent hours questioning them. please try to keep that in mind as we go through the jury selection process that, ultimately, you will be called upon to prepare a list of the panel members against whom you wish to exercise peremptory challenges, and I don't have the luxury to give you a lot of time to do that.

MR. TREMONTE: Your Honor, may I be heard briefly?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. TREMONTE: Just a few weeks ago, I participated in jury selection in a trial that was before Judge Rakoff in that room. It is very socially distanced in terms of the spacing between the lawyers. That case was a single-defendant case, so

I'm not sure how it works with multiple defendants, but I think we're going to want to be able to confer, as we share challenges. I'm not exactly sure how to do that, but I would just ask the Court's patience as we sort that out.

THE COURT: Yes. I mean, you're going to have to consult because you're going to have to jointly exercise these challenges. So absolutely I understand counsel are going to have to confer, and I will certainly permit you to do that.

Don't worry about that at all.

In any event, the list that you develop, and there will be — the defense is entitled to ten peremptory challenges as to the 12-member jury, and the government is entitled to six. You will submit those lists simultaneously. At sidebar I will review with you — I will review with counsel the panel members against whom the government has exercised peremptory challenges and the defense has exercised peremptory challenges. To the extent there were overlap between those lists, it just simply means that the juror's is being struck by both sides.

So we will go through that exercise. We will agree upon who the 12 lowest number panel members are who survive the process, and they will become our jury of 12. We will then turn to the selection of the alternates. You will once again prepare lists of the panel members against whom you wish to exercise peremptory challenges. As I said, each side will have two peremptory challenges for purposes of the selection of the

three alternate jurors. You will submit lists of the two panel members against whom you wish to exercise peremptory challenges. We will review those lists with you. We will reach agreement on who are the three lowest numbered jurors who have survived the process, and they will become our alternate jurors.

Any questions about the process?

MS. TARLOW: Not from the government.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to turn to the outstanding issues. There is a Kastigar motion that's presently pending before the Court. At the outset, I want to express my deep disappointment with both sides that this issue is still being litigated moments before we're scheduled to select a jury in this case which has been pending for more than two years. Briefing has continued to pour in from both sides despite the fact that the issue of the government's access to allegedly privileged information has been in play for two years, during which the defendants have been held in custody in the United States.

Defense counsel has known about this issue since at least October 2019 when the defendants were extradited to the United States from Croatia. It appears that both clients told their lawyers at that time that legal papers of some sort were taken from them at the Zagreb airport by DEA agents. The government also apparently made a discovery production to

defendants in January 2020 that included documents that the defendants claim were privileged. Despite this, neither defendant ever laid before the Court this issue until August 2021. Instead, the defendants filed a motion in October 2020 that included no specifics about the government's allegedly improper access to privileged material. Based on the defendants' inadequate filing at that time, I denied their application for a hearing as to whether the government's review of privileged information had been improper. Now, at that time defense counsel apparently already had had for months materials indicating that the government had reviewed or at least had had access to privileged information. None of that was laid before me at the time.

For the government's part, there has been an inexplicable failure to give proper attention to this issue despite repeated requests from Adamu's lawyer, Thomas Dunn, for legal materials taken from his client in Zagreb at the time of his extradition in October 2019. Mr. Hellman did not make appropriate efforts to determine whether this was true. In January of 2020, when Mr. Hellman began to have concerns that privileged material may have been seized from the defendants at the time of their extradition, he did not take appropriate steps to get to the bottom of that issue. In particular, he did not arrange for a taint team to review whatever it was that had been seized from the defendants in Zagreb, even when a

colleague repeatedly raised concerns that privileged material may have been taken from the defendants.

It was not until August of 2021, when the defense lawyers reviewed the hard copy material that had been seized from their clients in October 2019, that it became clear that the government had seized additional privileged material from the defendants, material that had not been disclosed in January 2020 in the government's discovery production.

These circumstances have led to a cascading series of submissions from the parties, a two-day testimonial hearing, and extensive briefing regarding the legal implications of the government's access to the defendants' privileged material. As I noted, briefing on this subject has been extensive and has continued right up until the last few days. The issues presented in the briefing are complex, in part because there's no governing authority in the Second Circuit as to the standards that apply when a Kastigar issue arises in the context of government access to a defendant's privileged material. Accordingly, the law is not well established regarding burden of proof and when it shifts to the government.

In normal times, I would adjourn the trial, but I can't do that in the midst of this pandemic given that the defendants have been held already for nearly two years in custody, not including the year they spent in custody in Croatia. Were I to adjourn the trial, given the restrictions

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on courtroom availability required by the COVID-19 pandemic, it could be six months before I am again given access to another courtroom, and the defendants would remain in custody during that time. Accordingly, we must press on to trial despite the unfortunate circumstances I have outlined.

With respect to defendants' Kastigar motion, in the Kastigar case, the Supreme Court established a broad prohibition on the use of compelled testimony protected under the Fifth Amendment. Citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). The Kastigar Court established a mechanism to enforce this protection: "When a witness has been compelled to testify relating to matters for which he is later prosecuted, the government bears the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate, independent sources." United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 91 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. 461-62). "The government must prove it has met this heavy albeit not insurmountable, burden of the evidence." Id. at page 92. The same protection applies to information protected by the attorney-client privilege. United States v. Schwimmer, 924 F.2d 443, 446 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The government must demonstrate that the evidence it uses to prosecute an individual was derived from a legitimate independent sources" and not "improperly" derived from "privileged information.") However, as I have noted, the Second Circuit has not set forth

the threshold showing necessary to shift the burden to the government to show that its evidence comes from an untainted source. Defendants have moved for a continuation of the evidentiary hearing that I conducted back on September 9 and September 14 of this year, arguing that "the evidence adduced at that hearing more than suffices to shift the burden" to the government to prove "that its trial evidence is derived from a wholly independent source." Citing the defendant's post-hearing brief, Dkt. No. 554, at pages 29 and 33.

Defendants argue that "mere glances or even just access to the privileged material" should shift the burden to the government to disprove taint. *Id.* at page 29. The government maintains that "defendants have not adduced sufficient evidence to shift the burden of proof to the government under *Kastigar*." Citing the government's post-hearing brief, Dkt. No. 562, at page 51.

While the government argues that "defendants have failed to prove that anyone from the government reviewed allegedly privileged materials," Id. at page 41, there is no question, given the evidence before the Court, that the agents and an analyst at the DEA, as well as members of the prosecution team in the U.S. Attorney's Office, accessed the materials seized from defendants during extradition which defendants claim contained privileged attorney-client material.

Further, the government has argued in its post-hearing

brief that, contrary to defendants' assertions, it has not changed its theory of the prosecution after reviewing defendants' material seized during extradition and "that the government did not use any privileged material." Citing the government's post-hearing brief, Dkt. No. 562, at pages 46-50 and 52-55. However, as defendants point out, the government cannot satisfy its burden under *Kastigar* in an unsworn filing where defendants have not been afforded the opportunity to confront the government's evidence.

As I have noted, there's no governing authority from the Second Circuit as to the circumstance in which a burden shift occurs where the government has had some amount of access to privileged material. As I have said here, there is no doubt that the government accessed privileged material in the sense that privileged material was scanned for purposes of producing it to the defendants. It is possible that the Second Circuit could conclude that such proven access is sufficient to shift the burden to the government to disprove taint. It is also possible that the Second Circuit could determine that there is no burden shift until a defendant has proffered evidence that a government agent or prosecutor actually read the privileged material. I have no way of predicting how the Second Circuit would come out on that issue.

Accordingly, I am going to give the defendants the hearing they have requested as to whether the government's

prosecution of the defendants has been tainted by the government's access to admittedly privileged information.

We will conduct that hearing tomorrow morning at 9:30, assuming that the jury selection process has been completed by that time. If not, we will proceed with a hearing immediately after the jury selection process has been completed.

The government will proceed first at that hearing, particularly in light of factual allegations it has made in a recent briefing that are not supported by affidavit or declaration. The defendants will have an opportunity to cross-examine the government's witnesses and to offer any evidence that they wish on the subject of whether the government's prosecution of the defendants has been tainted by the government's access to privileged material.

The defendants have repeatedly sought access to the government's grand jury presentation in this matter, arguing that this access is necessary for them to demonstrate that the government's strategy has changed as a result of the government's access to privileged information. I previously ruled that the defendants had not demonstrated an adequate basis for piercing grand jury secrecy. The defendants have recently renewed their application, which remains deficient. The government has disclosed to the defense that DEA agent Waters testified before the grand jury in this case. On December 19, 2018, long before the government came into

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possession of any privileged material, Agent Waters submitted a detailed affidavit in support of the government's request for extradition of the defendants from Croatia. Citing the December 19, 2018, Waters affidavit. The state of the government's proof at that time is fully set forth in the Waters' affidavit. Given the circumstances, defendants have not provided a sufficient basis for me to order the government to produce Agent Waters' testimony before the grand jury. Now, I would note that Agent Waters is going to be a government witness at trial. Is that true? MS. TARLOW: He may be, your Honor. THE COURT: He may be. Now, have you provided 3500 material for Agent Waters? MS. TARLOW: Yes, with respect to the limited topic that he might testify to regarding defendant Adamu's postarrest statement. THE COURT: All right. Now, I believe that in his

affidavit, Agent Waters discusses Adamu's postarrest statement. Isn't that true?

MS. TARLOW: The affidavit for extradition? I think that is accurate, your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. So to the extent that Agent Waters testified in the grand jury about Adamu's statement, you would be required to disclose that under 3500, right?

MS. TARLOW: Yes, your Honor, to the extent he

testified about the postarrest.

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THE COURT: So to summarize, we will proceed to jury selection today. Assuming we complete that process today, tomorrow at 9:30 a.m., instead of proceeding to trial, we will meet in this courtroom to conduct the evidentiary hearing I have referenced. As for the trial, after we complete jury selection, given the issues we have encountered in connection with the defendants' Kastigar motion, the need for an additional hearing on that matter, and the fact that Monday is a federal holiday, it is likely that I will excuse the jury until Tuesday, October 12, 2021. It is my expectation we will begin with opening statements at that time. I will endeavor to issue an opinion on the outstanding Kastigar motions before that time.

I want to turn to a motion in limine regarding the defendants' application with respect to cross-examination of the government's anticipated witness, DEA Agent Matthew

Fihlman. This is in relation to a letter of reprimand that Agent Fihlman received from the DEA back in 2008. Defendants argue that cross-examination on this point is appropriate under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) because the letter of reprimand involves "the accuracy and truthfulness of sworn statements

[Agent Fihlman] made to the DEA office of professional responsibility (OPR)" such that it "bears on [his] for character for truthfulness or untruthfulness." Citing

October 4, 2021, defense letter, Dkt. No. 575, at page 1. The government opposes defense counsel's application, arguing that the proposed cross-examination "pertains to remote historical conduct, is not probative of the witness' character for truthfulness, and will likely confuse and mislead the jury."

Citing the October 5, 2021, government letter, Dkt. No. 577, at page 1.

The background is as follows: In August 2006, the FBI began investigating members of the Dallas Police Department for possible misconduct. During that investigation, the government came — the FBI came to suspect that a former DEA task force officer working with the Dallas Police Department, a person named Sanders, "may have kept moneys actually due to [a confidential source she had utilized] for [the source's] cooperation." Citing the October 4, 2021, defense letter, Exhibit A, Dkt. No. 575—1, at page 3. The FBI requested the assistance of the DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility to obtain the payment records for this confidential source. Id.

Agent Fihlman was interviewed by the FBI and OPR investigators, and on June 13, 2007, he provided a sworn statement in which he said he had assisted Sanders "in conducting several investigations generally on a daily basis," that Sanders introduced Fihlman to the confidential source, and that Fihlman "participated in debriefings of the [confidential]

source] and participated in making payments to the [confidential source] with both DEA and Dallas Police Department funds." *Id.* at page 4.

Agent Fihlman also said that he was "either a claimant or a witness to those payments and that [his] signature appears as one or the other on a number of DEA documents corroborating those payments," and that he "signed as a witness on Dallas Police Department forms documenting payments to the [confidential source] utilizing DEA funds and witnessed several payments made by Sanders with Dallas Police Department funds on a Dallas Police Department form." Id.

When Agent Fihlman was confronted with the Dallas
Police Department payment forms "bearing [his] signature as the
witness for money paid to the [confidential source's] son, he
said [he] did not witness the payments to [the source's son],"
and that "on most occasions [he] witnessed Sanders hand the
confidential source the money, but that on a few occasions
[Fihlman] did not physically see Sanders hand the [confidential
source] the money." Id. Fihlman also "admitted that on some
occasion [he] did not witness the money being counted out
and/or physically exchanged," and that "there were occasions
when Sanders had already physically paid the [confidential
source] before [Agent Fihlman] was called upon to sign as a
witness to the payment," which Agent Fihlman admitted he
nonetheless signed, relying on Sanders' representation that the

payment had been made. Id.

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Based on Agent Fihlman's sworn statement in 2008, the DEA OPR charged Agent Fihlman with (1) "inattention to duty" for "signing as a witness to a confidential source payment [he] did not actually observe," Id. at page 4, and (2) "failure to follow instructions" for contravening the DEA standards of conduct requiring that employees sign documents only after reading and confirming them as accurate." Id. at page 5.

Based on these charges, which Agent Fihlman did not contest and which the DEA found to be "fully supported by the evidence," the DEA issued a letter of reprimand to him in May 2008. Id. at page 7.

I have not been provided with a sworn statement Agent Fihlman made during the investigation, nor the attestation he made regarding the payments to the informant. The government says that it has requested these materials from the DEA and will provide them to the Court and defense counsel once they are received. Citing the October 5, 2021, government letter, Dkt. No. 577, at page 3.

Accordingly, I will not rule on this matter now. However, I will give the parties my reaction to what I have seen so far.

Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides that generally "extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness' conduct in order to attack or

support the witness' character for truthfulness, but the court may on cross-examination allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness." Citing Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b).

Defendants argue that Agent Fihlman's "false sworn statements made to the OPR and signed statements in which he falsely attested to witnessing certain types of payments" are "probative of his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness" and that they should be permitted to cross-examine him on this subject. Citing the defendant's October 4, 2021, letter Dkt. No. 575, at page 3. Defendants also argue that because the "proposed line of questioning will be limited to the findings associated with the letter of reprimand" and will comprise "just a few questions," there is no danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. *Id.* at pages 3-4.

The government contends that "OPR's findings do not support the conclusions that Fihlman made false statements on forms and to OPR." Citing the government's October 5, 2021, letter, Dkt. No. 577, at pages 2-3. According to the government, "the OPR investigation did not charge Fihlman with making a false or a dishonest statement in connection with the payments [for which Sanders was investigating], and it did not find that Fihlman had lied during the course of the OPR's investigation." Id. at pages 1-2.

However, the documents that have been submitted to me indicate "when inspectors presented [Agent Fihlman] with Dallas Police Department [confidential source] payment forms bearing [Agent Fihlman's] signature as the witness for money paid to the [confidential source's] son, [Agent Fihlman] said he did not witness the payments to the source's son." October 4, 2021, defense letter, Exhibit A, Dkt. No. 575-1, at page 4. (Continued on next page)

THE COURT: But when Agent Fihlman was signing the form, he was attesting to the fact that he witnessed a payment when, in fact, he had not witnessed a payment on a number of occasions. Accordingly, his attestation that he had witnessed the payment was false. The fact that he made a false statement under these circumstances, and again, I need to see the form that he actually signed and what it says with respect to the attestation, but based on what I have seen so far, it does seem to me that Agent Fihlman's false attestation that he had witnessed a payment that was made when, in fact, he had not witnessed the payment, it does seem to me that is probative of his truthfulness.

The government further argues that cross-examination on this point should be precluded under Rule 403 because "the underlying fact pattern is complex," and would require "a lengthy discursion regarding these incidences, distracting the jury from the substance of Fihlman's testimony and the case on trial." Citing the government's October 5, 2021 letter, Dkt.

No. 577 at page 3. This argument does not appear persuasive to me because the facts underlying this incident seem very straightforward. When agents or police officers are making payments to confidential informants, it's obviously important that a record be maintained of that payment. Confidential informants are inherently suspect. They are often people who have engaged in criminal conduct, and the payments they receive

from law enforcement agencies give them an obvious motive to fabricate. So these are not outstanding citizens. They are people who have to be dealt with very carefully, and it's for that reason that law enforcement agencies have documentary requirements about payments that are made to such individuals. And so all of that seems very straightforward. And inherent in that circumstance, or those circumstances, is it's important that there be witnesses to payments that are made to such people because disputes can arise later about whether a payment was made or not.

And so it should have been obvious to everyone involved that it was important to the agency, important to the Dallas Police Department, that payments made to this particular confidential source's son, or to the confidential source him or herself, be properly documented. So it does seem to me that none of this requires extensive background. It's obvious that when money is paid, it's important to document it, and part of the documentary process is a certification from the agents or police officers involved that the money was actually paid. And given that Agent Fihlman admitted that he was actually not present when certain payments to the source or the source's son were made, it should have been obvious to him that attesting to the payment, or certifying that it was made, was improper, and it was in that context that he was reprimanded.

Now, it is true that the reprimand doesn't make a

finding of dishonesty or false statement or anything of that sort. As I said at the outset, Mr. Fihlman was disciplined for inattention to duty and a failure to follow DEA policy. So with respect to their reprimand, that's what it was for. There was no finding made that he was intentionally dishonest or that he intentionally made a false statement. And the government would of course be permitted to bring out those circumstances. But subject to my receiving the underlying documents, my inclination would be to permit cross-examination on the subject.

I want to turn some other issues that we discussed on Monday. There was an issue regarding David Cardona-Cardona's guilty plea to narcoterrorism and weapons charges. The defense raised concerns about what evidence would be admitted. I gave the parties my views regarding how the guilty plea of Cardona-Cardona to the narcoterrorism and firearms charges should be handled. Yesterday the parties submitted a joint letter informing me that they have agreed that the government will elicit from Mr. Cardona-Cardona on direct that he pled guilty to narcoterrorism and weapons charges, as well as the penalties he faces on those charges, together with the penalties he faces based on the narcotics charges he pled guilty to. But that neither defendant plans to cross-examine Cardona-Cardona on those charges, and the parties at this point don't plan to introduce Cardona-Cardona's cooperation

agreement. Moreover, the joint letter informs me that in the event it becomes necessary to introduce the cooperation agreement, the parties have agreed to redactions to remove any suggestion that the narcoterrorism and weapons charges are related to the defendants. The parties tell me they will provide a copy of the redacted cooperation agreement to the court before offering it as an exhibit. Accordingly, issues regarding Cardona-Cardona's narcoterrorism firearms crimes appear to have been resolved.

Defendant Adamu has submitted a letter seeking to call an expert witness, Michael Levine, to testify as to defendant's "blind mule" defense. Citing Dkt. No. 574. The government filed its opposition to that application last night, arguing that Levine's proposed testimony should be precluded because it "squarely invades the province of the jury in determining the defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense." Citing Dkt. No. 579.

Adamu's application to call Levine as an expert witness is denied without prejudice because counsel's submission disclosing the nature of the opinions Levine would offer is entirely inadequate under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)(1)(C).

Adamu's counsel has submitted a transcript of Levine's testimony in another case, United *States v. Gloria*Cespedes-Cano, 01 Cr. 157 (SJ), a trial that proceeded before

Judge Sterling Johnson in the Eastern District of New York.

See October 4, 2021 Dunn letter, Exhibit B, Dkt. No. 574.

Although I wasn't given background concerning the case before

Judge Johnson, I gather that the defendant was the subject of a

drug trafficking charge in that case. Drugs were found in a

bag she was carrying, perhaps at the airport. The drugs were

hidden in a compartment sewn in the bottom of her bag. Id.

Levine offered testimony for the defense. His testimony

indicates that he is an expert concerning the use of so-called

drug mules, and he opined, for a variety of reasons that he

explains in great detail, that the defendant in that case

likely had been a "blind mule," that is to say, someone who did

not know that there were drugs in her bag. Id. at ECF pages

15-16.

Although Mr. Dunn proffers Mr. Levine as an expert on "blind mules," see Dkt. No. 574, he does not provide any explanation of the opinions Mr. Levine will offer as to why Mr. Levine believes that Mr. Adamu was a so-called blind mule — that is, in these circumstances, someone who did not know that a kilogram of cocaine had been stored on board the G2 that was flown into Zagreb airport. Because of the deficiencies in Mr. Dunn's letter and disclosures, Adamu's application to call Levine as an expert witness is denied.

Are there other issues that the lawyers want to raise?

MS. TARLOW: Not from the government.

MR. BIALE: Not on behalf of Mr. Landji. 1 No, your Honor. 2 MR. DUNN: THE COURT: My deputy informs me that the jury office 3 personnel have asked that defense counsel and the government, 4 5 defendants, the marshals, etc., as well as the interpreter, 6 proceed to the jury assembly room in the courthouse across the 7 street so that they can show you the situation and so that they can make sure that the audio functions are appropriate, that 8 9 the interpreter can be heard, etc., etc. And then once they 10 have made sure that the arrangements are appropriate, they will contact me and we will head over. So if no one has any 11 12 questions, I would ask you to please proceed across the street 13 to the jury assembly room, and I will see you there once I am 14 told that we are ready to proceed. 15 Thank you, all. 16 (Recess) 17 (Jury selection commenced) 18

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